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A reappraisal of accounting changes in Dutch local government 
 
 





SOM theme D, Management accounting and financial management 






Municipalities and provinces in the Netherlands, denoted here as local government, have 
introduced many major accounting changes and changes in other management control aspects since 
1985. However, various change initiatives and new instruments were dropped after a short while, 
were superseded by new reforms, or only used to a limited extent. Interviews with 23 politicians 
and professional managers in local government made clear that they often were critical about the 
reasons for and the effects of the changes. For example, fads, a desire to ‘look modern’ and 
mimicry sometimes played a part in the introduction of the changes. Previous academic research 
suggests that in several cases the high ambitions of New Public Management have not been 
realized. However, this explorative paper does not primarily discuss the gap between expected and 
realized management changes. Instead, it focuses on the actual effects resulting from the 
accounting changes in the perception of the persons interviewed. The institutionalist approach that 
is used in this paper focuses on changes in rules, routines and institutions. The institutionalist 
approach of the accounting changes in Dutch local government suggests that, seen over the longer 
run, gradually some effects may have been realized that have considerably changed their culture 
and increased their citizen and result-orientedness. Further, the explorative paper indicates that an 
institutionalist perspective draws attention to factors and developments that might not be noticed 
when a more functional and short-term perspective is chosen. 
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Since about 1985, Dutch municipalities and provinces, hereafter referred to as local 
government, have seen a succession of changes in various aspects of their management 
control. These ‘management changes’ relate to such aspects as organizational structure, 
financial and management accounting, and other aspects of financial management, human 
resources management, strategy, and quality management. For example, many local 
government organizations decentralized their organizational structures, privatized 
activities, strengthened their IT, and introduced output and outcome-oriented planning and 
control, customer orientedness, quality models and multidimensional performance 
management, and competence management, or strengthened the role of such instruments. 
All these reforms can be regarded as being related to the introduction of New Public 
Management (NPM). This paper focuses on changes that were made to management 
accounting systems in Dutch local government. In addition, it examines other management 
changes in the organizations concerned. 
 The government organizations that initiated reforms probably consider some of the 
changes to be a success. In other cases, reforms were dropped after a while, often tacitly, 
for example because they were superseded by new developments or were harder to 
introduce or use than was originally expected. Several authors are critical of the effects of 
NPM changes and especially output and outcome-oriented accounting changes in the 
Netherlands, including performance measurement. And not without reason, because in 
several cases high ambitions have not been not realized (see, for example, van Helden, 
1998; Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2000; van Helden and Johnson, 2002; ter Bogt, 2004). 
However, this paper does not primarily discuss gaps between expected and realized 
management changes; i.e., the question of whether they are a success or a failure. Instead, 
it focuses on the actual effects in government organizations as a result of introducing 
accounting changes. Scapens (1994, p. 303) indicates that too much emphasis on an 
‘idealized’ picture might block one’s view of aspects of organizations where relevant 
changes did take place. He suggests that, to get a picture of the effects that certain changes 
have had in practice, it might be particularly important to obtain knowledge of the working 
methods that have changed. In line with this, after a brief presentation of the reasons for 
the changes, the paper will focus on the change processes and the effects of the changes 
that were observed by 23 politicians and professional managers from various organizations 
who were interviewed. With respect to these effects, the focus is also on the question 
whether they are somehow ‘NPM-like’. 
 NPM can be regarded as a functionalist approach, in that one of the most important 
objectives of the changes it proposes is to increase economic efficiency and effectiveness 
in public sector organizations. However, to understand accounting changes in local 
government organizations and their effects, it could be fruitful to try to study them with an 
open mind, not overly restricted by a narrow theoretical point of departure (cf. Hopwood 
and Miller, 1994). This paper mainly examines accounting changes from an institutionalist 
point of view, which makes it possible to focus on various possible reasons for introducing 
accounting changes, on change processes, and on the effects of the changes. An 
institutional framework combines economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions in 
the analysis of organizations and change processes (Scapens, 1994, p. 303). 
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 The paper presents the interviewees’ experiences with changes over a period of 
fifteen to twenty years, indicating whether, in the interviewees’ opinion, some of the goals 
of NPM have been achieved and its spirit implemented through the accounting changes. 
Subsequently the paper examines any possible reasons for a reassessment of, or further 
research into, the results of NPM-related accounting changes. 
 After this introduction, the paper is structured as follows. The next section will 
briefly introduce NPM and some major accounting changes and other management 
changes in Dutch local government organizations. Section 3 reviews institutionalist 
literature and literature on accounting change, and presents the research question. Section 4 
discusses the research design. Section 5 will present the reasons for accounting changes as 
perceived by the interviewees. In section 6, some of the interviewees' critical remarks 
about accounting and other management changes will be discussed. Section 7 includes an 
overview of interviewees’ perceptions of the effects of several major accounting changes 
in Dutch local government organizations. After an analysis and a discussion of the research 
findings in section 8, the paper ends with a summary and some conclusions in section 9. 
  
 
2. NPM in Dutch local government since about 1985 
 
Until the mid 1980s, the financial management of Dutch local government, like that of 
local government in many other countries, was traditionally highly input and process-
oriented, i.e. organizations were controlled by means of financial budgets and procedures. 
The adoption of output-oriented planning and control and private sector management 
approaches was at the core of innovations in local government in the 1980s and 1990s. 
These changes were brought about by budgetary deficits in the 1980s, criticism in society 
of the tasks and functioning of government, as well as dissatisfaction within government 
organizations with centralized organizational structures and input-oriented forms of control 
(ter Bogt and van Helden, 2005, pp. 248, 255-256). 
 In 1979, a change in the Governments Accounts Act obliged the Dutch provinces to 
introduce accrual accounting from 1982. Furthermore, municipalities have had to apply 
accrual accounting rules since 1985. In the preceding years, the organizations had already 
started to gradually implement changes to the traditional cash-budgeting system. 
 Spurred on by changes in, for example, public and political appreciation of 
government tasks and budget cuts in the 1990s, a lot of local government organizations 
introduced output-oriented planning and control documents, such as budgets and related 
documents, e.g. interim and annual reports. These documents were supposed to contain all 
kinds of information on government performance.1 Another initiative that became very 
popular among municipalities and provinces was the Public Management Initiative (PMI; 
in Dutch: BBI), which was started in 1987 with very high expectations (van Helden, 1998). 
 PMI can be regarded as an NPM-like project, as the most important changes 
introduced through PMI closely resemble those initiated through NPM (cf. Hood, 1995). 
PMI formally aimed to make political and administrative decision-making more 
transparent and effective, and to bridge the observed gap between authorities and citizens 
(Houwaart, 1995, pp. 15, 45). In actual practice, PMI’s main objectives were to rationalize 
day-to-day management, to make government organizations more ‘businesslike’, and to 
increase efficiency and effectiveness. The exact characteristics of NPM vary from country 
to country and have developed over the course of time (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002, 
pp. 10-11; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2005, pp. 74-96; Humphrey et al., 2005). However, it 
 4 
seems that NPM, just like PMI, strongly focuses on rational management and economic 
efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organizations. 
 With PMI, most municipalities and provinces introduced decentralized 
organizational structures. PMI’s focus was particularly on the development of output-
oriented planning and control, which involves the use of output budgets, interim reports 
and annual accounts, all containing financial and non-financial performance information. 
This was intended to improve the organizations’ insight into their performances and to 
increase efficiency, transparency and public accountability. Further, with PMI, private 
sector management techniques were introduced, activities were privatized, and instruments 
such as job appraisal interviews were introduced, although sometimes hesitantly (ter Bogt, 
2004, pp. 221, 244). Decentralized organizational structures, initially organized by policy 
fields, were introduced because, both externally and internally, there was growing 
dissatisfaction with the traditionally centralized, inflexible, bureaucratic, and not really 
service-oriented organizations. These organizations had experienced a rapid increase in 
tasks, size, and budgets since the late 1950s. Since the mid 1990s further reforms have 
been introduced; for example, reforms relating to organizational structures, financial 
management, strategy development, human resources management, the role of IT, and 
quality management, including multi-dimensional performance measurement (see also 
Kickert, 2000, pp. 113-121; Martens et al., 2002). In addition, many organizations have 
started to take part in benchmarking projects. 
 Since 2004, after the introduction of the so-called dual system in local government, 
the new Governments Accounts Act has required the Dutch provinces and municipalities to 
make a distinction between policy-based outcome budgets (i.e. programme budgets) and 
output budgets (i.e. product budgets).2 In every municipality, the municipal council 
determines the outcome budget, which is a broad outline of future activities, the resources 
involved, and the outcomes to be achieved. The Municipal Executive exercises control by 
means of output budgets, which are more detailed, in that they are supposed to list the 
products to be delivered and the resources that can be used (see also Bac, 2003, pp. 661-
665). Similar changes have taken place in the provinces. The municipalities and provinces 
are free to decide what programmes and outputs they wish to define, what information they 
will include in output and outcome budgets, and what the layout will be. 
 Besides these accounting changes, several local government organizations have 
taken initiatives to introduce various other, more technical, changes in their financial 
management. Quite often, for example, decentralized organizational units have started to 
present their own budgets and annual accounts, although a consolidated budget and annual 
accounts are prepared for the whole organization. Further, professional managers of 
organizational units are often given considerably more freedom to make substitutions 
between budgets. Several organizations have also started to pay more attention to, for 
example, internal control, financial or otherwise, and have introduced new financial 
administrative systems that make it easier to consolidate financial information from 
decentralized units. Apart from this, some changes were introduced under the 
Governments Accounts Act, which applies to all local government organizations. These 
changes include an obligation to allocate indirect costs to functional categories within 
budgets (i.e. to policy areas), rules on risk disclosure in budgets, and a clearer distinction 
between reserves and provisions (see, for example, Bac, 2002).3 
 The major accounting changes mentioned above are the focus of the empirical 
research presented later in this paper (cf. Bac, 2003, pp. 597-599). In particular, the 
significance of accrual accounting in local government will be discussed, as well as output 
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budgets/PMI, outcome budgets, and performance information and benchmarking. The 
politicians and professional managers that were interviewed during the empirical research 
strongly focused on these accounting changes. In general, previous research also seems to 
consider them as the more ambitious accounting changes. This research often was quite 
critical of the results realized through these changes (see, for example, van Helden, 2000; 
Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2000; Aardema, 2002; Bac, 2002, 2003; van Helden and Jansen, 
2003; ter Bogt, 2004; ter Bogt and van Helden, 2005; Mol, 2006). However, most of the 
previous research focused on relatively short periods or the effects of the changes in a 
rather ‘technical’ sense. It could be interesting to see whether, seen over the long run, 
people in practice perhaps perceived some other effects of the changes.  
 
 
3. Institutions and accounting change: literature review and the research question 
 
The introduction of NPM, its Dutch counterpart PMI, and related NPM-like management 
changes could be regarded as changes to the management control systems of public sector 
organizations. The management control system of an organization includes all the 
resources that the management has at its disposal in order to control and manage the 
organization while striving to ensure its continuity. The organization’s performance and 
effectiveness are influenced by these various controls, including its accounting systems, as 
well as other internal and external factors (Otley, 1980, pp. 421-422; Birnberg, 1998). 
 NPM and PMI literature seem to mention primarily functionalist reasons for control 
changes in government organizations. A functionalist approach to organizations 
presupposes that an organization, and the individuals within it, rationally choose means to 
achieve their objectives. That is, a functionalist and rational approach presupposes that, in 
order to ensure the continuity of an organization, its choices and decisions are based on 
considerations such as improvements in economic efficiency and effectiveness (cf. 
Covaleski et al., 1996, pp. 4-7).4 However, several authors have suggested that, in practice, 
not only economic factors, but also other factors, may play a part in the introduction of 
control changes in both profit and non-profit organizations (see, for example, Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Ansari and Euske, 1987; Brunsson, 1989; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
 This section will first explore literature in the field of institutional theory, to 
introduce some basic ideas of institutionalism, and then relate institutional theory to 
accounting change. The aim of this exploration is to find factors in institutional theory that 
could explain why Dutch local government organizations have changed their control 
systems so often. In this way, factors mentioned in theory can give guidance to the 
empirical field research. 
 
An exploration of institutional theory 
 
NPM literature often suggests that the most important explanation for changing the control 
of government organizations is the desire to improve performances, i.e. to increase 
economic efficiency and effectiveness. However, as previously indicated, not all authors 
are convinced that organizational changes are mainly intended to increase economic 
efficiency and effectiveness. They suggest that factors such as expectations and values 
both inside and outside the organizations and rules in society can also play a part in a 
decision to introduce management changes. Institutional theory offers the opportunity to 
explore such factors when organizations are researched. This section will present some 
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basic ideas of old institutional economics (and its more modern versions) and of 
sociological institutionalism, which together will hereafter be simply referred to as 
institutional theory. 
 Institutional theory emphasises the influence that structures in society and the 
social and cultural aspects of an organization’s environment – such as the rules, 
knowledge, power, standards, and habits in a particular group or society – and their 
development have on an organization – and vice versa. Compared to functional 
organization theories, institutional theory broadens the range of aspects of an organization 
and its environment which have to be considered (Scott, 1995, p. xiv; see also Oliver, 
1991, pp. 146-151; Covaleski et al., 1996, pp. 9-12; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 
1025; Chenhall, 2003, p. 159). 
Old institutional economic theorists and more recent authors informed by them 
focus on organizational forms and their characteristics, especially efficiency, and also on 
the influence of institutions, such as social and cultural aspects (Veblen, 1898, pp. 390-
393; Commons, 1931, pp. 649-650, 654-657; Bush, 1987, pp. 1079-1080; Powell, 1991, 
Van de Ven, 1993, pp. 149-151; Covaleski et al., 1995, pp. 26-30). In general, authors 
drawing on the ideas of old institutional economics indicate that changes in society and 
organizations might be induced by ‘technical/economic’ as well as ‘institutional’ factors. 
That is, they suggest that economic efficiency as well as social and cultural issues might be 
important for enhancing the continuity of an organization and for inducing change 
processes. Greenwood and Hinings (1996, pp. 1025, 1034-1038), in trying to explain 
organizational change, indicate that ‘organizational behaviors are responses not solely to 
market pressures, but also to institutional pressures’. Besides, institutional theory not only 
focuses on organizations, but also on the individuals within organizations. That is, 
institutional theory underlines the role of economic and social/cultural issues, individuals 
and organizations, and individuals and organizations and their environment, as well as their 
interconnections (cf. Granovetter, 1985, pp. 506-507). In fact, it suggests that it might 
often be difficult to separate clearly the economic and social concerns of an individual and 
an organization. Since some decades, institutional authors seem to be specifically 
interested in the behavioural aspects of organizations and individuals, probably also 
inspired by the work of such authors as Simon (1959) and Cyert and March (1963). All in 
all, institutional theory seems to be very broad nowadays. It focuses on individuals within 
organizations, their habits, and intended and unintended changes in their behaviour, as well 
as on organizations and the external factors which influence them. 
In line with old institutional economics, Scapens (1994, p. 309) argues that ‘an 
emphasis on rule-based behaviour ... does not deny that people have reasons for doing 
things. Although individual actors may not consistently pursue rational choices, their 
activities are guided by their intentions ...’.5 This suggests that people could introduce 
changes in an organization with a view to raising profits and contributing to its continuity 
(Scapens, 1994, pp. 307, 315; see also Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 15). In a sense, 
Scapens indicates that a striving for satisfactory economic results – probably to be 
regarded as a moderate form of economic rationality – could play a part in a decision to 
change the management controls of an organization. 
Authors in the field of sociological institutionalism generally do not pay much 
attention to functional reasons for management reforms or to economic efficiency and 
effectiveness, i.e. economic rationality. The sociological institutional literature is 
concerned with, for example, the question of mimicry (i.e. why do organizations follow 
trends and fads and mimic changes of other organizations in their sector) and why there are 
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fixed templates for organizational change, and thus ‘isomorphic’ organizations (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983, pp. 149-150). Further, authors in this field suggest that changes are 
sometimes only introduced to formally satisfy external rules or expectations; i.e. for 
reasons of ‘external legitimation’ (see e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977, pp. 352, 356-359; 
Ansari and Euske, 1987, pp. 557-564; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, pp. 1025-1026). By 
the formal adoption of changes in external rules, or by conforming to much-used or 
‘elsewhere successful’ organizational forms and working methods (‘myths’), an 
organization may seek to avoid critical attention and questions from its social environment 
and thereby achieve external legitimacy (cf. Oliver, 1991, pp. 150-153). In other words, it 
is conceivable that such an organization acts in a ‘socially rational’ and ‘socially efficient’ 
way (see ter Bogt, 2003, pp. 160-163).6 
 
Institutionalism, PMI/NPM and evolutionary accounting change 
 
PMI/NPM could be a response of Dutch local government organizations to internal factors 
like budgetary stress, i.e. economic factors, and external changes in expectations and 
formal rules (i.e. in external institutions). Internal dissatisfaction with traditional, 
hierarchical, input-oriented working methods may also have played a part. Some of these 
reasons were mentioned, e.g. in policy notes , when PMI/NPM was introduced in Dutch 
local government (Houwaart, 1995, pp. 15, 45). Institutionalism, too, might suggest that 
financial problems, changes in formal rules, and expectations in the organizations' 
environment may have induced management changes like the introduction of new 
accounting systems. The changes may have been intended not only to make organizations 
more businesslike and to increase economic efficiency and effectiveness, but also to show 
sensitivity – well-intentioned or superficial – to new external and internal demands, or to 
formally fulfil the new requirements and expectations. Besides, institutionalism draws 
attention to the interrelatedness of the various elements. For example, once a new 
accounting system is introduced, this might effect not only an organization’s efficiency, 
but the internal and external expectations and the organizational and individual habits as 
well. 
Some authors use the ideas of institutionalists as a basis for explaining management 
accounting change. For example, Burns and Scapens (2000) developed a framework for 
management accounting change which draws on old institutional economics (see also 
Scapens, 2006, pp. 14-18). Burns and Scapens define ‘rules’, ‘routines’, and ‘institutions’ 
as basic concepts to explain management accounting change. In their framework, ‘rules are 
the formalized statement of procedures, whereas routines are the procedures actually in 
use’ (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 7). As Burns and Scapens indicate, rules in an 
accounting context are part of a formal accounting system laid down in manuals, whilst 
routines are habits and accounting practices that are actually in use. Rules are usually not 
changed continuously, only at certain moments. However, routines may change gradually 
as a result of daily changes in working methods. A change in routines may result from, for 
example, experiences with existing working methods, a change in rules, or social pressures 
to change, which could result from internal or external dissatisfaction with certain practices 
and performances, newly developing values in society, increasing relative power of a 
certain group, or other changes in internal or external institutions (cf. Oliver, 1992, pp. 
566-569; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, pp. 1024, 1035). Although routines are probably 
influenced by rules, routines often differ from formal rules in certain respects. A formal, 
‘ceremonial’ change in rules does not necessarily mean that the ways in which managers, 
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and other employees, actually think and act change in the same way. For example, it might 
be some time before any real changes in managers’ thinking and acting can be observed. 
A formal change of rules can be relatively easily implemented. The management of 
an organization can, for example, decide to introduce a new system of performance 
evaluation. However, even when the formal rules and procedures are well-defined, it could 
be less easy for the management to clearly establish the actual ways of using of the new 
performance evaluation system, i.e. the routines involved. Changes in routines can be 
intended or unintended. The extent to which actual routines change depends on the 
influence of other routines, rules, and institutions. Burns and Scapens (2000, pp. 5-6) 
define an institution as ‘a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, 
which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of people’. Institutions are 
‘settled ways of thinking common to a community’ (Burns, 2000, p. 571). 
In Burns and Scapens’ opinion, institutions shape the everyday actions and working 
procedures of individuals in organizations. Conversely, institutions are the outcome of 
daily actions and working methods, i.e. routines and institutions probably influence each 
other continuously (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 8). Institutions may produce stability in 
organizations, or tendencies for isomorphism in a certain group of organizations, but they 
are not invariable. The wider institutions in society make up the external institutional 
environment of an organization, whilst specific internal institutions form the internal 
institutional environment (which can be closely linked to the external environment in 
various respects). The internal institutional environment comprises the practices, i.e. 
routines, which have become taken-for-granted over time, which suggests that the ways in 
which employees behave are constructed over a period of time (Scapens, 2006, p. 17). 
Organizational culture is an important element of the internal institutions of an 
organization, as it may heavily influence the beliefs, values, and practices of its 
participants. 
As routines are embedded in the ‘history’ of an organization and are shaped by 
relatively stable institutions, it could be expected that routines generally change only in a 
gradual, evolutionary way. However, when an organization or its environment experience a 
sudden shock – for example in the case of a government organization that is going to be 
privatized – certain routines can go through major changes in a short period of time, 
perhaps because the employees understand that the continuity of the organization may be 
at stake (Scapens, 2006, pp. 17-20). 
Institutionalism and the framework of Burns and Scapens could perhaps serve as a 
basis for analysing and understanding accounting change processes after the introduction 
of PMI/NPM in Dutch local government organizations.7 That is, to more completely 
understand accounting change processes in organizations and their effects, it could be 
interesting to try to offer an analysis of accounting changes in Dutch local government that 
is based on institutional theory. Such an analysis includes economic as well as social and 
institutional reasons for these changes. This analysis could also indicate whether to some 
extent the effects of the changes are in line with the ideas of NPM advocates. 
It seems that, until now, empirical research in the public sector has rarely focused 
simultaneously on all these reasons and the gradual changes that may take place in the 
practices and functioning of these organizations (cf. ter Bogt, 2006, 2007). That’s why it 
could be interesting to explore the possible contribution of institutionalism to 
understanding accounting change and its effects in the public sector in a broad sense. 
Based on the discussion of institutional theory and accounting change, the following 
research question is formulated: 
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What economic and other factors have influenced the introduction of accounting 
changes in Dutch local government and what effects, if any, have resulted from 
major changes being implemented in the formal accounting systems of the 
organizations involved? Seen over the long run, are these effects mainly symbolic, 
or do they actually influence the way the organizations and individuals in these 
organization function, including their values and habits, and have they contributed 
to a more ‘businesslike’ culture? 
 
 
4. Research method 
 
Recent changes in the control of Dutch local government have been discussed in section 2, 
where it is suggested that that several authors are of the opinion that the quality, effects, 
and success of these changes are doubtful; i.e. they are probably not nearly so good as was 
expected or hoped for at the start of the PMI-initiative. This raises the question of why 
many local government organizations have introduced major changes in the control of their 
organization so frequently. Are these organizations just interested in new management 
fads? Or do they continue to introduce control changes because they are striving for an 
increase in economic efficiency and effectiveness, and because they hope or believe that 
the changes, old and new, will be effective? Is it possible that, although previous research 
concludes that the high ambitions have not been realized, still some useful effects have 
been achieved in the organizations involved? 
 To find tentative answers to these questions, it was decided to conduct descriptive 
and exploratory research. Several documents on changes in accounting and other control 
aspects in local government organizations were studied. Between September 2004 and 
April 2005, semi-structured interviews were held with 23 politicians and professional 
managers in twelve municipalities and two provinces (see Appendix A and Appendix B).8 
During one part of each interview, questions were asked about the reasons for the 
management reforms and the effects of the accounting changes that were introduced.9 This 
paper is largely based on the questions which asked the interviewees to look back from a 
point in time and to discuss their experiences and perceptions of the changes which had taken 
place. 
 The research question formulated in section 3 served as a guideline for the interviews 
(cf. Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536). The aim of the interviews and studying the additional written 
information was to gain an insight into factors and effects that, according to participants in the 
field, were relevant with respect to accounting change in their organizations and sector. The 
research primarily focused on the organizational field of local government organizations, not 
on individual organizations. Intending to collect all kinds of possibly relevant information on 
the sector concerned, the researcher asked the interviewees to express themselves on their 
own experiences. 
 This research intends to obtain general information on the interviewees’ perceptions of 
changes, their longer term experiences, and relevant contextual factors. A contextual approach 
implies that the focus of research is, for example, not only on the strictly ‘technical’ aspects of 
new accounting techniques, but also on the reasons for the introduction, on the impact, and on 
the internal and external environment of these techniques (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992, pp. 
6-11, 16). When the evolution of accounting in a specific sector is studied through time, a 
processual approach is followed (Burns, 2000, p. 568; see also Pettigrew, 1997). The 
empirical research was inspired by the ideas of a contextual and process approach, but in the 
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present stage the findings are based on ‘one-off’ interviews. It might be necessary to conduct 
further longitudinal and in-depth case research, or surveys, in order to fully examine the 
process of, the reasons for, and the effects of accounting changes in local government 
organizations. The descriptive and exploratory research that was conducted in these 
organizations probably did not cover all relevant stakeholders and issues, and did not yield 
statistical and generalizable evidence. However, this research might still generate ideas to 
focus on in further research (see also Lukka and Kasanen, 1995, pp. 75-86; Scapens, 2004, p. 
260; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 1045; Berry and Otley, 2004, p. 249). 
 The interviewees were selected in consultation with two contact persons, a professional 
manager and a politician, both of whom had many contacts who might be interesting 
interviewees, in the sense that they might provide a wide range of perceptions of management 
changes. Since, conceivably, people’s perception of the effects of certain changes is 
influenced by their position, the interviewees were primarily selected on the basis of their 
activities in order to obtain a varied picture of existing opinions as well as an impression of 
possible differences between subgroups of interviewees (i.e. politicians/civil servants and 
financial/non-financial subgroups).10 It was hoped that the exploratory field research would 
yield a wide range of opinions on management changes in the field. At this stage of the 
research, it was more important to collect interesting insights and opinions that could form a 
basis for further research than to use a representative sample of politicians and professional 
managers. In this way, the paper could contribute to developing a future research agenda. 
 The semi-structured interviews ranged in length from one hour to over two hours. 
During the interviews, the interviewees were also asked to extensively discuss factors that 
induced management reforms and to express their ideas about possible future management 
reforms. The findings with respect to these subjects were presented in a comprehensive report 
in Dutch and in another paper (ter Bogt, 2005, 2007). A detailed written report was made of 
each interview and sent to the interviewee for comment. Any such comments were then 
incorporated into the final reports on the interviews, which are the basis for this paper. 
 
 
5. Perceptions of reasons for accounting changes 
 
In the interviews, many politicians and professional managers said that it was difficult for 
them to strictly separate changes in the management accounting system of their 
organization from other ‘NPM-like’ management reforms, such as the introduction of new 
organizational structures, quality management, and increased attention to human resources 
management. Various interviewees were of the opinion that most of these changes were 
actually interconnected and were part of a lengthy reform process in local government 
organizations. 
 Asked about the reasons for introducing the changes and their intended effects, 
almost all of the interviewees thought that an important aim of the changes was to improve 
economic efficiency and effectiveness (see also ter Bogt, 2005, 2007).11 Budgets cuts in 
the 1980s, the first half of the 1990s, and in the 2002-2005 period led to the introduction of 
instruments which were intended to increase efficiency and effectiveness. 
 The interviewees also indicated that, besides economic rationality, social/political 
rationality played a part in the introduction of changes; i.e. a desire to attract votes and 
political support in the future (see also ter Bogt, 2003). In their opinion, the introduction of 
the changes was also a consequence of criticisms in society, and in politics, of the 
performance of the government sector. Probably because several voters had lost interest in 
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politics and government, or were disappointed in government performance, there was a 
sharp fall in turnout rates of municipal and provincial elections in the early 1990s.  This 
may have accelerated the introduction of changes, especially the introduction of 
decentralization and output budgets and related planning and control documents. Voters’ 
dissatisfaction also probably led to the rise of the Fortuyn movement at the national level 
and the ‘Livable’ parties (in Dutch: Leefbaar) at a local level in 2001-2002. They could be 
regarded as ‘protest’ or ‘populist’ parties which attracted considerable numbers of voters in 
several municipalities and provinces. The ‘sudden’ rise of these protest parties showed that 
political volatility had increased considerably, which added to a feeling of uncertainty 
amongst politicians (and professional managers).12 
 However, there may also have been other ‘social’ reasons for changes, including 
changes that were mainly ceremonial or symbolic in nature. Over two thirds of the 
interviewees indicated that, to a certain extent, the introduction of the changes was 
influenced by such factors as fads and a tendency to follow new ideas, fear of being 
regarded as a ‘laggard’ by colleagues in other organizations or the press, advice from 
external consultants, and lessons from experiences elsewhere. 
 
 
6. Some critical remarks about the effects of accounting change and other 
management reforms 
 
The interviewees generally found it difficult to clearly indicate the combined effect of 
various management changes that were introduced. It was even more difficult for them to 
separate the effects of new accounting instruments from those of other management 
reforms that were introduced in their organization. As interviewee E, a financial manager, 
observed: 
 
Together with changes in planning and control, [other] changes were taking place … They 
were all interconnected; it seemed like a flood, really. They were so tied together and were 
introduced quite automatically … so it is hard to single out one aspect and tell what 
happened exactly. … But, looking back, you can see of course that, all things considered, 
things are vastly different compared to [fifteen years ago]. 
 
For the most part, the effects of the various changes were not measured. The interviewees 
also indicated that their organization generally did not make a great effort to measure 
efficiency and effectiveness. In the opinion of some of the interviewees, certain 
management changes had even had a negative effect on the functioning of their 
organization. Although they were critical of the management changes, and admitted that 
there was a lack of ‘hard evidence’ of their effects, almost all the persons interviewed said, 
however, their perception the overall effects of the various management changes was 
slightly positive. However, the effects that were actually achieved were probably not 
always the same as the intended effects. 
 Interviewees were also rather critical of the effects of changes in the planning and 
control of their organizations. Several interviewees were of the opinion that for many years 
the focus of NPM/PMI had been too much on such ‘technical’ issues as organizational 
structures and accounting instruments. 
 Although many interviewees did feel that there was a need for their organizations 
to focus on outputs and performances, they were not very positive about the effects of 
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some of the major accounting changes that had been introduced. In general, they had a low 
regard for the quality and value of the information in the output budgets and the 
performance indicators included in planning and control and other documents. They 
indicated, for example, that they themselves and other people in their organization hardly 
used the output information in planning and control documents. All in all, the ‘technical’ 
aspect of PMI, i.e. the introduction of output budgets, was not considered to be a success. 
In addition, several interviewees were also critical of the information in the outcome 
budgets that had recently been introduced. Interviewee A, an alderman, said for example: 
 
Self-management, … product and programme budgets; we have all used them or we are 
still using them. But it is by no means certain that they have made any difference. 
 
 
7. Interviewees’ perceptions of the effects of accounting changes 
 
The interviewees expressed themselves to be critical of the effects of accounting changes 
and other management changes. However, they did think that these changes had had some 
effect, positive or otherwise, on the functioning of their organizations, although the effects 
might become visible only gradually. This section will present some research findings with 
respect to the effects of some of the major accounting changes that were introduced in 
Dutch local government, i.e. accrual accounting, output budgets/PMI, outcome budgets, 




The introduction of accrual accounting in the early 1980s could have meant that civil 
servants needed some additional training to apply the system. However, since the 1950s 
the traditional cash accounting system had gradually been changing into a ‘modified cash 
accounting system’ which enabled the construction of a balance sheet. Further, the decision 
to report amounts payable and receivable at the end of the year made it possible to 
calculate accruals expenditure and revenue of a policy area (Bac, 2002, p. 267). 
 Strictly speaking, the introduction of accrual accounting amounted to a 
consolidation of existing practices that was largely uncontroversial and raised hardly any 
serious problems, especially because in many cases the introduction of accrual accounting 
was initially regarded as a ‘technical’ change. The organizations involved continued to 
focus on financial information rather than outputs and outcomes, which meant that the 
accountability process in these organizations was not fundamentally changed (see also ter 
Bogt and van Helden, 2005, pp. 265-266; Mol, 2006, p. 36). 
 As accrual accounting was introduced more than twenty years ago, many 
interviewees said that they found it difficult to clearly indicate the specific effects of its 
introduction. However, some interviewees were able to indicate some effects of the 
introduction of accrual accounting, which in their view contributed positively to the 
economic basis of decision-making and the functioning of their organizations. 
 Interviewee F, a very experienced financial manager, explained clearly, for 
example, why he had eventually formed a positive opinion on the effects of accrual 
accounting. Although he, too, observed that the visible effects of the formal introduction of 
accrual accounting probably were not very great, he added that its introduction also 
implied that a more businesslike approach was brought to the fore, initially mainly in a 
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financial sense, but gradually also in the general management of the organizations involved 
and in their ways of thinking. 
 Interviewee F indicated that it would, for example, not have been possible to 
prepare output budgets containing information on unit costs of activities and outputs, if 
accrual accounting had not been introduced. Besides accrual accounting, his municipality 
had also introduced a time recording system in order to get a clearer picture of budgeted 
and actual costs. Calculating unit costs was probably not considered to be a very prominent 
and effective management change. However, as interviewee F suggested, the fact that time 
is recorded and costs are calculated shows that civil servants and politicians in his 
organization gradually started to think in terms of products and unit costs. In his opinion, 
this indicated a change in organizational culture, that also contributed to the inclusion of 
such cost perspectives in policy discussions. 
 
Output budgets and the Public Management Initiative 
 
Due to the Public Management Initiative, in which municipalities and provinces could 
participate of their own volition, a large majority of Dutch municipalities introduced output 
budgets between the late 1980s and the year 2000. As was observed earlier, previous 
research has shown that these outputs budgets, and the performance information included 
therein, as well as the related interim and annual reports, were often evaluated negatively. 
The 23 interviews with politicians and professional managers could also lead one to think 
that their regard for PMI and the contents and quality of output budgets and related 
documents was rather low and that these documents were not used very much. PMI and 
output budgets involved a lot of paperwork, which was not helpful. A lot of interviewees 
shared interviewee M’s opinion on output budgets: 
 
Initially, the PMI ideas looked attractive … but on closer consideration it seemed that it 
would be quite hard to implement them. It was probably a good idea to strive for a 
pragmatic, businesslike approach, but it turned out that it was not that simple to achieve in 
a municipality. And performance measurement, an important element of PMI, turned out to 
be difficult. 
 
Interviewee M and several other interviewees, made similar critical observations about the 
outcome budgets that were introduced between 2000 – 2002 and about performance 
measurement in general. However, the critical attitude of most respondents towards the 
contents and usefulness of output budgets did not mean that they were all of the opinion 
that output budgets served no purpose whatsoever. Some interviewees indicated, for 
example, that PMI had revived their interest in planning and control, even though it had 
contributed only marginally to increasing their output-orientedness. PMI had a positive 
effect on the transparency of the costs and cost structure of departments and activities, as 
well as on the quality of financial budgeting and reporting. As a result, fewer organizations 
exceeded their budgets or underspent; even if they did, interim reports often had ‘warned’ 
them for this so that measures already could be taken. This suggests that PMI contributed 
to improving the financial management of the organizations involved. 
 Several interviewees were also of the opinion that the introduction of output 
budgets made them and their colleagues think more in terms of products and performance. 
Interviewee C regarded the introduction of output budgets as a “useful contribution to the 
process of defining tasks and clear responsibility structures, of becoming more professional 
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and businesslike and making clearer agreements”. Many interviewees agreed that the 
culture of their organizations was influenced by PMI and output budgets, in that it was 
changed from being mainly input and process-oriented into being more output-oriented. In 
addition, some interviewees observed that, in practice, decentralization of organizations 
often included the introduction of output budgets. In their view, this combination made 
organizations less hierarchic and inflexible, and resulted in a gradual increase in the task, 
product and result-orientedness and transparency of decentralized units. In that way, too, 
the culture of organizations had been changed gradually. 
 Interviewee N, an alderman, thought that discussions with his professional 
managers about the contents of interim reports were quite helpful. He thought so, not 
because of the information in the reports, but because, during these discussions, he was 
often informed of recent developments concerning the subjects reported. Moreover, he was 
of the opinion that discussions about interim reports enabled him to make clear to 
managers and other civil servants what elements were important in a political sense, and 
why they were important to him. In this way, he was able to focus the attention of 
professional managers on subjects that were important to him and other politicians. 
 Some interviewees remarked that preparing output budgets (and outcome budgets) 
had also affected the work of non-financial employees. Interviewee L observed, for 
example, that an increasing number of employees had to make use of planning and control 
information and was involved in producing this information. In her opinion, this was 
mainly due to the fact that planning and control information was no longer strictly financial 
in nature, but also ‘content-oriented’. This meant that the production and interpretation of 
planning and control data could no longer be the exclusive tasks of financial specialists and 
that content-oriented’ employees had to pay more attention to financial information. 
 Similar observations were made by interviewee V, a professional manager, who 
remarked: 
 
The [planning and control] formats are now … much more aimed at encouraging managers 
and other employees to actually use the available information for organizational control. … 
I now also try to encourage this, for example by asking, when some problem crops up: did 
it really come like a bolt from the blue or was it to be expected in a way, considering the 
available information? Now, take this simple example: if extensive maintenance work was 
carried out on a movable bridge ten years ago and then nothing was spent on further 
maintenance, how surprising would it be that it broke down and would it be reasonable to 
present this breakdown as an unexpected incident? … In this way, people will gradually 
realize that the plans we draw up and the information we collect can actually be useful for 
their work, and then you will see that they really use it more often. 
 
To conclude, the findings from the interviews suggest that, on the one hand, the 
interviewees were rather critical of the contents, quality and usefulness of output budgets 
and related reports, and the performance information in these documents. On the other 
hand, the interviews suggest that working methods, employees’ attitudes, and 
organizational cultures were changing in certain respects. In the opinion of the 
interviewees, these changes in working methods, attitudes and cultures were probably 







With the introduction of the previously mentioned dual system in 2002/2003, central 
government obliged all local governments to draw up outcome budgets (and outcome 
annual reports) in addition to product budgets. Some municipalities and provinces have 
produced outcome budgets since about 2001. As was indicated earlier, the 
municipal/provincial council determines the programmes in the outcome budget. The 
outcome budget and related documents, including interim and annual reports, are supposed 
to contain information on main lines on the municipal/provincial council’s policy 
framework. This should enable the council to exercise control on main lines over the 
organization and policy initiatives. 
 The outcome budget lists a number of programmes, e.g. 10 to 20, but this number 
can vary according to the desires of a municipality or province (MBZK, 2003, p. 63). Each 
programme concentrates on a policy area and policy aspects that are of prime importance. 
A programme is supposed to contain the main goals to be achieved, the activities to be 
performed, and the resources available to realize them. All municipal or provincial 
activities and resources are supposed to contribute somehow to the realization of the 
programmes. Besides outcome budgets, municipalities and provinces have to draw up the 
output budgets discussed above, in which programmes are specified in more detail; i.e. 
products are listed. The Executive Committee is responsible for achieving the aims of 
product budgets, which are supposed to be linked to the outcome budget. The Executive is 
also accountable to the council for the degree and the way in which the outcome budget is 
realized. 
 Although many local government organizations have not yet had much experience 
with outcome budgets, most interviewees have formed an opinion on their effects and use. 
A lot of interviewees did not consider the outcome budget a great success in a ‘technical’ 
sense. The goals of the programmes mentioned in outcome budgets were often not well or 
clearly defined, or could not be measured, quantitatively or otherwise. Further, the 
programmes did not always provide a clear insight into financial matters; for example, 
performance indicators were incomplete and/or of limited use for controlling the 
organizations concerned. Several interviewees were of the opinion that it was very difficult 
to clearly define the goals that were to be achieved through the programmes and to 
describe their organizations’ contribution to achieving these goals. 
 A few interviewees clearly were of the opinion that it was unrealistic to expect that 
outcome budgets could really play an important role in steering and evaluating an 
organization. They regarded outcome budgets as an obligation imposed by central 
government and thought that their organizations should not invest too much energy in the 
development of programmes and outcome budgets. Interviewee E indicated, for example, 
that it was decided to simply combine products from the output budgets into groups 
according to policy areas and to present this grouped information as programmes. The 
interviewees also said that it was usually very difficult for councillors to clearly define the 
main aims of programmes and to indicate how these should be translated into coherent 
programmes and how they should be evaluated. 
 All in all, most interviewees were quite critical of outcome budgets, the information 
in these budgets, and the way they were drawn up and used. However, some of them said 
that in the course of time they had observed some positive effects of outcome budgets. 
Interviewee M remarked, for example, that outcome budgets provided clearer policy lines 
and did actually serve as a guide to political and organizational activities. 
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 Some interviewees indicated that politicians – especially councillors, but members 
of the Executive Committee too – were always interested in details and probably had to be 
because the media and society seemed to be increasingly interested in them. However, the 
interviewees also observed that the introduction of outcome budgets seemed to have made 
politicians slightly more interested in long-term goals and effects. Interviewee J, an 
alderman, said: 
 
[The] council [now] tries to indicate goals for a somewhat longer period of time, as well as 
the effects to be achieved. … Initially I was not very enthusiastic about the outcome budget 
at all, but now I do appreciate the resulting stronger focus on policy programmes. 
 
A few interviewees indicated that it had become clear that the preparation of outcome 
budgets had also effected the way civil servants discuss policy areas, their role in drawing 
up accounting information, and their use of this information. Interviewee O, a professional 
manager, said, for example, that outcome budgets had gradually changed the way in which 
various organizational units contributed to planning and control documents and the 
information in these documents. He observed: 
 
The question of what effects should be achieved with a certain policy programme will not 
be answered by financial employees, but by people in other parts of our organization. … 
This means that more people in various places in the organization will have to provide 
information and have to cooperate. Although this was not an intended effect of the 
outcome budgets, it is a nice side-effect, because in this way more people in our 
organization will think about our present and future performances and their attitude 
towards municipal financial resources. 
 
 To recap, the interviewees generally held critical opinions on the outcome budget 
as such and the performance information in this type of budget. However, some of them 
did indicate that the introduction of the outcome budget meant that the activities of civil 
servants and politicians, e.g. defining and discussing the content of policy areas, had 
gradually become more focused. More often than before, specific policy areas were 
considered in the wider context of a policy programme. In some cases, the number of civil 
servants involved in thinking about and drawing up the outcome budget increased; i.e., this 
activity was no longer the exclusive task of financial specialists. 
 
Performance measurement and benchmarking 
 
Performance measurement, NPM/PMI and the introduction of output budgets, as well as 
the more recent introduction of outcome budgets and benchmarking are all closely related. 
In fact, performance measurement seems to be the overarching concept that plays an 
important part in the introduction of all these accounting changes. It will be discussed 
separately because it is closely connected with the ‘technical’ aspects of accounting and 
accounting changes, with changes in other aspects of the management of an organization, 
such as human resources management and organizational culture, and also with the 
evaluation and control activities of managers. 
 Most interviewees were disappointed about their recent experiences with 
quantitative performance measurement in output and outcome budgets and related 
documents. However, many of them were also of the opinion that it was important to 
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continue trying to improve performance measurement. They were sometimes quite 
optimistic about the opportunities provided by recent developments in the field of 
performance measurement; particularly benchmarking, which can give a picture of 
‘relative’ performances, monitor research amongst citizens, and citizen panels. Further, 
nowadays performance information is often collected using the Balanced Scorecard or 
‘quality models’ like the popular INK model, which is similar to the international EFQM 
model. 
 Almost all interviewees identified problems with the ‘proper’ quantitative 
measurement of several aspects of government performance, which certainly would not be 
completely resolved with the new techniques. However, despite problems with, for 
example, comparability of information, many interviewees thought that a technique like 
benchmarking could mean that gradually more useful performance information would be 
produced in their organizations. Benchmarking could supplement planning and control 
information and give a picture of relative performance. In that sense, it could contribute to 
an organization’s transparency about activities and performance. 
 Many interviewees, especially politicians, also indicated that the information from 
monitor research amongst citizens and other similar initiatives was very useful to them. 
They indicated that they also used this information for controlling their organizations. In 
their opinion, measurement of citizens’ opinions on policy areas, initiatives, and local 
government activities yielded a reasonably ‘objective’ picture of citizens’ appreciation of 
government activities and performances. This information could be helpful, in that the 
interviewees could gain an impression of the effectiveness of their organizations and they 
could use the information to increase accountability and transparency for citizens and other 
stakeholders. 
 Some interviewees observed that the need for politicians to focus on performance 
was probably intensified by the fact that they were more directly confronted with and 
criticized by citizens and the media. In this context, several interviewees remarked that 
they felt more uncertain after the strong rise of ‘protest’ and ‘populist’ parties around 2002 
and the increase in political volatility among voters in the Netherlands.13 Several 
interviewees thought that in recent years, probably as a result of this uncertainty and 
volatility, their organizations had increasingly and seriously paid attention to their 
performances, improving performance information, and performance-based human 
resources management. Interviewee I observed: 
 
I realize that more transparency and accountability, a striving for a more businesslike 
attitude and all these things are quite fashionable and that people may be somewhat cynical 
about them. … [But] I am still inclined to think that these changes do have an impact. 
Some parts of our organization have, for example, definitely kept up a tradition of not 
being transparent … There is now more pressure to resist this tendency of units to do just 
their own thing and keep quiet about financial or other problems. 
 
 To conclude, it seems that such activities as benchmarking and monitor research 
amongst citizens have yielded performance information that has gradually played a more 
important role in the control of local government organizations and their attempts to 
become more transparent to external stakeholders. In addition, several interviewees made 
clear that the introduction of output and outcome budgets has also helped to develop and 
encourage a more performance-oriented culture in their organizations. In the opinion of 
some interviewees, their organizations have gradually showed less tolerance of an 
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uncommitted attitude towards transparency, performance, and performance information. 
Some of the organizations have decided to link salary increases to performance evaluation; 
not only at higher, but also at lower levels in the organizations. 
 Most interviewees still perceive several problems with regard to performance 
measurement. However, the interviews do suggest that new and existing types of 
performance information are gradually becoming more important. Improvements and more 
positive views of this information have resulted in an increase in its use, which may have 
stimulated the rise of a more performance-oriented organizational culture. However, the 
reverse seems to be true as well, as the interviews also suggest that a more performance-
oriented culture – enhanced by, for example, human resources management – has 
stimulated the use of performance information. 
 
 
8. Analysis and discussion 
 
This section analyses the interviewees’ observations about the effects of accounting and 
management changes in Dutch local government organizations. The analysis will explore 
whether the change processes in these organizations can be understood with the help of 
concepts from institutional theory and Burns and Scapens’ institutional framework for 
accounting change. If so, concepts and insights derived from these theories should be a 
basis for further research on accounting change in the local government sector, for example 
at the micro-organizational level. 
 Drawing on concepts from institutional theory and Burns and Scapens’ framework, 
the various changes in accounting systems that were introduced in Dutch local government 
can probably be regarded as changes in ‘rules’ (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Some changes 
in the external institutional environment, such as budget cuts and an obligation to introduce 
accrual accounting and outcome budgets, could also be regarded as changes in rules. Such 
external changes have influenced various initiatives to introduce internal management 
changes in Dutch local government organizations, including new accounting systems. 
Although certain technical problems may arise when a new accounting system is being 
implemented, it seems to be relatively easy to promulgate a change in rules and to 
introduce them ‘on paper’. 
 However, it remains to be seen whether participants in an organization will 
completely understand and abide by a change in rules, i.e. to what extent they will change 
their ‘routines’. Several interviewees also indicated that new accounting systems and 
information were hardly used initially, or for a long time. According to institutional theory, 
the routines of an organization may continuously show signs of slight change as a result of 
daily experiences and developments, but they are ‘rooted’ in the organization’s values and 
traditions. Generally speaking, routines, i.e. habits and daily working methods, show a 
gradual and evolutionary development rather than sudden, major change (see also Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, pp. 130-131; March and Olson, 1983, pp. 287-289, 292; Horwitz, 1992, 
pp. 156-167; Covaleski et al., 1995, pp. 7, 23-28). 
 After a while, routines can become ‘institutionalized’, in that they become part of 
the ‘institutions’, i.e. ‘settled ways of thinking’, inside and outside an organization (see 
also Hopwood, 1990, pp. 11-15). Various factors can influence institutions, which, for their 
part, can influence routines. It seems that settled ways of thinking in the external 
environment of Dutch local government have changed since the 1970s and 1980s. For 
example, changes in values and expectations with respect to Dutch local government and 
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its performance probably signify changes in external institutions. Internal dissatisfaction 
with the slow and inflexible functioning of many large government organizations suggests 
that internal institutions may also have changed. Such changes in institutions could have 
stimulated changes of rules and routines. However, the external and internal changes in 
values usually occurred gradually and did not result in sudden, major changes in routines. 
 The stability of routines, their gradual change, and the influence of the history of 
organizations are also apparent from the interviews in local government organizations. 
New rules, i.e. accounting systems, were introduced, but they were not well understood, or 
they yielded information that was not considered to be useful. The interviewees indicated 
that the information from the new accounting systems was hardly used for controlling their 
organizations; this suggests that the participants continued to use the existing routines. It 
would probably not be correct to say that they deliberately resisted change, as there is 
nothing in the interviews to suggest such resistance (see also Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 
2005, pp. 54-56). However, politicians and civil servants still based their decisions and 
control largely on ‘traditional’ input and process-oriented information (cf. Scapens, 2006, 
p. 17). This traditional working method may have come from the culture and training of 
the older civil servants, who tend to focus on inputs and procedures. It may also have been 
used because the new accounting rules had not yet been brought into line with other rules 
and systems (such as the performance evaluation system). 
 However, the interviewees also indicated that they had observed some effects of the 
accounting and other management changes that might suggest that routines gradually 
changed over several years. These effects include an increase in the actual use of 
performance information, in service-orientedness, and ‘thinking in terms of products and 
effects’ (cf. Modell, 2004, pp. 43-48). The two last-mentioned developments could 
probably be regarded as changes that are in keeping with the ideas of NPM. 
 It seems that, in most of the local government organizations concerned, there were 
also signs of a gradual change in other rules, e.g. in quality and human resources 
management, and in internal institutions, i.e. organizational culture (see also Busco et al., 
2002, pp. 46-49). That is, internally the importance of such aspects as high quality 
performances, keeping to agreements and client-orientedness was more emphasized and 
supported than in the past. This was also the attitude of young civil servants, who were 
brought up with ‘NPM-like’ values during their professional training, as some interviewees 
observed. Changes were not only induced by budget cuts and new rules, but also by 
external social and political factors, such as decreasing turnout rates in local elections, a 
more critical attitude towards government in the media and society, the rise of ‘protest’ and 
‘populist’ parties, and increased political volatility (see Abrahamson, 1996, pp. 270-274). 
Due to the social/political factors, in particular, many participants in the organizations 
concerned felt the need not only to introduce new rules (such as output and outcome 
budgets), but also to make considerable changes to their routines (e.g. increase their focus 
on performances in controlling the organizations). Interviewee V, a professional manager, 
summed up the gradual change process in his organization as follows:  
 
The change process has already taken a long time, but finally, after about fifteen years, you 
see that, little by little, our organization and many of the people working here are really 
starting to change. 
  
 The various effects of accounting changes that were observed by the interviewees 
can probably be regarded as evolutionary changes in routines and institutions. These 
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changes in routines and institutions may have induced further changes in rules, routines, 
and institutions. Changes in organizations and in institutions, rules, and routines can be 
regarded as being part of continuing and interactive processes which develop as a reaction 
to different stimuli and which in some periods accelerate and in other periods slow down 
(cf. Burns, 2000, pp. 587-592; Hodgson, 2004, 412-418, 451-452). Similarly, the change 
processes in Dutch local government organizations show signs of both stability, e.g. use of 
traditional working methods, and change, e.g. increase in performance-orientedness 
(Schein, 2002, pp. 35, 40-43).14 The information collected during the interviews suggests 
that the change processes in the Dutch local government sector will take quite some time, 
especially if the persons involved do not feel an urgent need for radical changes. The 
interviews also show that both external and internal institutions are very important to local 
government organizations, probably because of the ‘public and open’ character of the 
government sector and the need to attract support from citizens/voters. For these reasons, 
external institutions and influences could be more relevant to the management of 
government organizations than to that of private sector organizations. 
 Although social structures, i.e. institutions, may play a significant role in the 
introduction of accounting changes, it is also important not to underestimate the role of 
subgroups of people and of individuals, as well as their preferences, characteristics, 
positions, and backgrounds (see also Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 377; Hodgson, 2004, pp. 
441-446). Groups and individuals may be affected by rules, routines and institutions in 
slightly different ways. This paper outlines the results of the interviews in general terms, 
although obviously many different individual observations were made during the 
interviews. They seem to indicate, for example, that the politicians involved attached a 
slightly higher value to information from monitor research than the professional managers, 
probably because of their backgrounds. The interviews did not show any other notable 
differences between the groups of persons involved (financial/non-financial subgroups; 
politicians/professional managers), although longitudinal and in-depth case research or 
research on a larger ‘sample’ might yield different results. 
 To conclude, although the interviewees were critical of the effects of the various 
accounting changes, the research findings suggest that, seen over the long run, some effects 
– such as an increase in thinking in terms of products and attention for clients, transparency 
and performance – are probably in line with those of PMI/NPM. With respect to 
institutional theory and the Burns and Scapens framework, the conclusion could be that 
they seem to be of help to analyse and tentatively interpret the research findings. Such an 
institutionalist analysis draws the attention to interactive change processes and effects of 
accounting changes that gradually develop in the longer run. However, to more fully 
understand accounting change in local government organizations, the roles of individuals 
and groups, as well as the role of external institutions, probably deserve more attention 
than they seem to receive in the Burns and Scapens framework. 
Apart from that, the observation that institutions play an important part in the 
introduction of accounting changes does not necessarily imply that politicians or managers 
who want to introduce such changes cannot influence their adoption at all. It would be 
interesting to examine the adoption and implementation process and relevant factors, 
especially because it is uncertain whether citizens/voters, politicians, professional 
managers, other civil servants, and other stakeholders are satisfied with the effects that 
have gradually become visible in recent years. After all, many of the intended effects of 
NPM-like accounting changes and other management changes have not been achieved. 
However, this paper does not focus on more practically-oriented frameworks for the 
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implementation of accounting change (see for that, e.g., Shields and Young, 1989; Lapsley 
and Pettigrew, 1996). 
 
 
9. Summary and conclusion 
 
The interviewees were critical of the accounting changes and other control changes that 
were introduced in their local government organizations. For example, they generally 
showed a low regard for the information in output and outcome budgets and related 
documents, and they hardly used these documents. In addition, some interviewees 
suggested that the opportunities offered by accrual accounting were not fully exploited. 
These results of the exploratory research in the field of Dutch local government 
organizations suggest that the accounting reforms and other management reforms were not 
wholly perceived as a success by these organizations. The interviews also suggest that the 
organizations involved did not realize the high ambitions defined in NPM/PMI with 
respect to the accounting changes that are considered more specifically in this paper – i.e. 
the introduction of accrual accounting, output and outcome budgets, and performance 
measurement (including benchmarking). In addition, the interviews indicate that changes 
were sometimes introduced because the organizations involved felt the need to mimic 
changes introduced elsewhere or the need for external legitimation. This might suggest that 
the local government organizations did not make a real effort to realize the ambitions of 
NPM. 
 However, when the information from the interviews is examined more carefully, it 
becomes clear that it can not be argued that the changes did not have any effect at all or 
that they were not liked at all. Despite their criticisms, the interviewees were of the opinion 
that, all in all, the various changes had had a slightly positive effect on the functioning of 
their organizations. They mentioned several concrete changes in working methods and also 
effects which, in their opinion, positively contributed to the functioning of their 
organizations. It is also clear, however, that a lot of the effects of the accounting changes 
became visible only gradually and that some effects were probably different from what had 
been intended. 
 The interviewees indicated that such factors as changes in citizens’ expectations 
with respect to government, and trends and new fads played a part in the frequent 
introduction of management reforms since about 1985 (ter Bogt, 2007). In addition, they 
mentioned such factors as the introduction of new rules by central government and a fear 
of being considered a ‘traditional’ organization by the media and citizens (cf. Malmi, 1999, 
p. 667; Lapsley and Wright, 2004, pp. 371-372). However, a very important reason for 
introducing changes was the desire to increase efficiency and effectiveness. An increase 
was considered to be necessary for several reasons, including budget cuts, the more critical 
attitude of the media and citizens/voters, and the strong increase in political volatility 
among voters (Greenwood and Stewart, 1986, pp. 43-44). All this suggests that social, 
ceremonial, and economic factors played a part in the introduction of accounting changes 
and other management changes in Dutch local government (cf. research question). 
Similarly, economic, social, and political rationality all played a part in their introduction 
(see also Järvinen, 2006, pp. 43-44; ter Bogt, 2007). 
  The introduction of accrual accounting, output and outcome budgets, performance 
evaluation, and other NPM-like changes did not necessarily mean that organizational 
control would really be largely based on information that became available through such 
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techniques. Several interviewees thought that the changes did have positive effects on the 
organizations involved, however; they contributed to gradual changes in the routines and 
culture/institutions, which made the organizations slightly more ‘businesslike’, citizen and 
performance-oriented, and transparent (see research question). Accrual accounting, for 
example, made it easier to ‘properly’ calculate costs of government products and made 
various costs more transparent. In this way, it probably influenced the cost awareness of 
politicians and civil servants. The introduction of output and outcome budgets meant that 
outputs and outcomes were increasingly the focus of internal and external discussions in 
the organizations concerned. In addition, several civil servants started to think more in 
terms of results, clients, and the quality of services to be delivered. This may also have 
been due to the fact that human resources management was linked to individual 
performance. 
 The interviewees also mentioned some other effects that they welcomed. Because 
output and outcome budgets contain financial data as well as data on the ‘content’ of 
policy fields, non-financial employees and politicians had become more involved in the 
process of planning and control and in using these kinds of information (see Burns and 
Vaivio, 2001, p. 396). The interviewees suggested that the involvement of a greater 
number of people with different backgrounds would mean that the financial management 
and general control of their organizations had improved. 
 The aim of the research was to gain an overview of developments and issues at the 
sector level, so it did not focus on individual organizations. It seems that the focus and 
concepts of institutional theory and Burns and Scapens’ framework can be helpful in 
explaining and understanding the developments observed by the interviewees. Accounting 
changes can be regarded as a change in the rules in the organizations involved. The 
research seems to indicate that the routines in the organizations have also changed, but at a 
slower pace than the rules, and perhaps with unexpected results. Institutions may have 
influenced the change of routines and some new routines may have become 
institutionalized; i.e. become part of the institutions (e.g. a more performance-oriented 
culture). The research findings suggest that social factors and structures influence the 
accounting change process in the local government organizations to a considerable extent. 
However, further research in a larger number of these organizations could focus on the 
roles of individuals and groups, and the roles of internal and external institutions, since 
they, too, might play an important part in change processes. The role of such factors may 
be underestimated in institutional theory. 
 The research suggests that the actual effects of accounting changes on decision-
making and control are not quite so functional and direct as they should be according to the 
‘ideals’ of the advocates of NPM (see also Hoggett, 1996, pp. 20-24). However, it seems 
that accounting changes do bring about some effects like the ones intended by these NPM 
advocates, although rather gradually, qualitatively, and implicitly. The interviewees 
indicated that the introduction of accounting changes should not be regarded as a pointless 
exercise. As was observed earlier, it could be difficult to achieve changes that, for 
example, result in the inclusion and use of mainly quantitative, high-quality information 
about performances and unit costs in planning and control documents and other 
documents, i.e. technical changes that are probably a prime aim of PMI/NPM. However, it 
seems that accounting changes do bring about some changes in organizational culture and 
individual behaviour that seem to be in keeping with the ideas of NPM, i.e. a greater focus 
on performance, external stakeholders, and a businesslike attitude (see also Budding, 2004, 
pp. 301-302). Many routines in local government organizations are probably relatively 
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stable. However, external and internal changes in values and expectations can induce not 
only various ‘technical’ changes in the accounting and other control systems of an 
organization, i.e. a change in its rules, but probably also gradual changes in its routines and 
institutions. These changes might, for their part, contribute to further internal and external 
changes in rules, routines, and institutions. 
 This paper indicates that an institutionalist perspective enables one to study change 
processes in organizations and to observe factors and developments that might not be 
noticed when a more functional and short-term perspective is chosen (cf. Modell, 2004). 
This institutional reassessment of NPM-like accounting changes in Dutch local 
government suggests that, although various intended effects were not achieved, the 
changes may have had effects which were liked by participants in the organizations 
involved and which contributed to the functioning and continuity of the organizations. 
More information on change processes and the concrete factors that influence these 
processes might also provide insights which are actually relevant to the management of 
organizations. 
 The findings in this paper, which are based on information from a limited number 
of persons and organizations, cannot give a ‘representative’ overview of the field. Neither 
do they give a clear picture of the developments in an individual organization, as they are 
not based on in-depth case research in organizations. The interviewees were only asked to 
look back from one moment in time and give their perceptions of change processes and 
their effects. This might mean that not all factors that actually played a part in the change 
processes and not all relevant effects were recollected and mentioned (see also Malmi, 
1999, p. 668). However, it seems that the research findings do suggest that an institutional 
approach could be helpful in a study of accounting change processes in government 
organizations. After this exploratory overview, it could be worthwhile to conduct further 
survey or in-depth case research in the government sector, using an institutional 
perspective. Further research should probably be longitudinal so that problems with 
accounting change processes in government organizations, and factors that play a part, can 
be examined in more detail and over a longer period of time. 
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Appendix A: Municipalities/provinces of the interviewees, their population size at 
January 1, 2004*) and their number of civil servants**) 
municipality population size number of civil servants 
Assen 62.000 700 
Den Haag 469.000 8.500 
Eindhoven 208.000 2.100 
Groningen 179.000 2.600 
Hengelo 81.000 850 
Hoogezand-Sappemeer 34.000 350 
Leeuwarden 91.000 1.050 
Nijmegen 157.000 2.000 
Rotterdam 599.000 19.000 
Smallingerland 54.000 400 
Utrecht 270.000 4.000 
Zwolle 111.000 1.130 
   
province population size number of civil servants  
Fryslân 642.000 900 
Groningen 574.000 800 
* Source: www.cbs.nl/nl/cijfers/kerncijfers/nederland-regionaal.htm 
** Source: interviewees in the organizations involved 
 
 
Appendix B: Interviewees and their position (politician / professional manager; 
financial / non-financial sphere of activity) 
financial sphere of activity  
name position 
E. Bos  professional manager, municipality of Smallingerland 
M.A.E. Calon member of the Executive, province of Groningen 
C.T. Dekker member of the Executive, municipality of Groningen 
T. Jellema professional manager, province of Fryslân 
J. Huisman professional manager, province of Groningen 
M. Mittendorff member of the Executive, municipality of Eindhoven 
R.E. Stäbler member of the Executive, municipality of Hoogezand-
Sappemeer 
B. Trouwborst professional manager, municipality of Utrecht 
A.M.M.M. Verbakel professional manager, municipality of Eindhoven 
T. Vlieger professional manager, municipality of Assen 
H.M.Y. Wassink professional manager, municipality of Groningen 
J.H.C. van Zanen member of the Executive, municipality of Utrecht 
 
non-financial sphere of activity 
name position 
L.M.M. Bolsius member of the Executive, municipality of Rotterdam 
C.H.J. Brugman professional city manager, municipality of Leeuwarden 
O. Dijkstra professional city manager, municipality of Zwolle 
H. de Haas professional manager, municipality of Leeuwarden 
D.M.F. Jongen professional city manager, municipality of Den Haag 
dr. R. Neij professional manager, municipality of Den Haag 
H.J. Nijhof member of the Executive, municipality of Hengelo 
G.J.M. van Rumund member of the Executive, municipality of Nijmegen 
W.R. Sluiter  member of the Executive, municipality of Leeuwarden 
J. van der Weij professional manager, province of Fryslân 
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1
 Within Dutch government the term performance is reserved mainly for activities, outputs and outcomes. In 
this paper, too, the concept of performance is not primarily associated with inputs, but with activities, outputs 
(goods or services), and outcomes, as well as related aspects, such as data on processes, quality and service, 
and unit costs of outputs. 
2
 This change is a consequence of the dual system of government, which was introduced for municipalities in 
2002 and for provinces in 2003. In municipalities, the responsibilities and powers of the municipal council 
are now more clearly separate from those of the Municipal Executive, i.e. the mayor and aldermen. 
Councillors are elected every four years by voters/citizens, whilst aldermen (often former councillors, 
although gradually more outsiders too) are elected by councillors. Provinces have a similar system. 
 Being a councillor is mostly a part-time activity (8-20 hours a week). In municipalities with over 
approx. 15,000 inhabitants and in all the provinces, being a member of the Executive is a full-time job. At 1 
January 2006, the number of municipalities in the Netherlands was 458; the number of provinces was 12. 
 The introduction of the dual system has also resulted in various changes to planning and control. 
The municipal or provincial council is supposed to outline policies in outcome or programme budgets in a 
more explicit fashion than in the past, whereas the Municipal or Provincial Executive Committee is clearly 
responsible for policy execution. The council determines the outcome budget, which is a broad outline of 
programmes for certain policy fields, i.e. future activities, the resources involved and the outcomes to be 
achieved. In practice, the contents of outcome budgets are often extensively prepared by civil servants and 
the Executive Committee. The Executive exercises control by means of output budgets, which are more 
detailed, stating the products to be delivered and the resources that can be used. Outcome budgets and related 
documents, such as interim and annual reports, are supposed to describe clearly and in broad outline the 
municipal or provincial council’s policy framework and programmes, which should enable the council to 
exercise overall control. 
3
 Under the Governments Accounts Act, local government organizations have some discretion to decide for 
themselves how exactly they want to interpret and apply centrally issued regulations. In practice, this means 
that the way the rules are applied varies from one municipality or province to another. 
4
 It seems that rationality in NPM is not necessarily the same as neoclassical unbounded rationality. NPM 
literature does assume that changes in organizations are motivated by a desire to increase economic 
efficiency and/or effectiveness, but generally it does not postulate that this will lead to a maximum level of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Instead, the changes may be motivated by a desire (of the top) of organizations 
to reach ‘satisfying’ levels of efficiency and/or effectiveness (Simon, 1955, pp. 103-106; 1959, pp. 262-264). 
5
 This is not to deny that the intentional actions of individuals may also have unanticipated consequences 
(Scapens, 1994, p. 309). 
6
 Social efficiency might be defined as the ratio between the amount of resources, including time and energy, 
which an organization invests in persons and groups within and outside the organization, and the (degree of) 
realization of the own plans and aims of the organization. These plans and aims may be those of one or two 
dominant groups within the organization (cf. Brignall and Modell, 2000). In a similar way, political 
efficiency could be defined as the amount of ‘resources’ that has to be invested in voters to obtain one vote in 
elections. 
7
 In a general sense, the Burns and Scapens’ framework can help to observe and understand factors and 
processes that play a part when changes are introduced in organizations. It seems that the framework is not 
primarily intended to draw attention to all kinds of specific ‘pitfalls’ or variables that in practice might 
deserve attention to succesfully implement accounting changes. For such purposes, other models to explain 
accounting change and change of organizations might be more helpful (see, for example, Shields and Young, 
1989; Lapsley and Pettigrew, 1996; Kotter, 2000;  ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000; Caccia and Steccolini, 
2006). 
8
 At the beginning of 2006, the total number of municipalities in the Netherlands was 458. The municipalities 
where persons were interviewed ranged in size from 35,000 to 600,000 inhabitants. Smaller municipalities 
were not included, because previous research findings indicated that these municipalities generally 
introduced fewer management reforms (Moret/A+O fonds, 1997). The Netherlands comprises 12 provinces. 
The two provinces where interviews took place, Friesland and Groningen, had about 640,000 and 570,000 
inhabitants respectively. 
9
 In another paper, also based on the 23 interviews, the reasons for the management changes and the 
expectations about future changes are discussed extensively. Appendix A presents the persons interviewed, 
arranged in alphabetical order of their surnames. The interviewees were promised anonymity to encourage 
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them to speak candidly during the interviews, but they all explicitly agreed to being mentioned in a list of the 
persons interviewed (see also, although in Dutch: ter Bogt, 2005, p. 74). The 23 interviewees are referred to with 
the letters A to W inclusive, which correspond to the order in which they were interviewed. 
10
 In addition, some attention was paid to such criteria as size of municipality, geographical spread and political 
party (in the case of politicians). In total, 24 persons were asked to cooperate in the research. One of them 
refused because he was too busy at that time due to an amalgamation of certain municipalities. 
11
 Most interviewees also expressed a certain concern about the various reforms in their organizations. Not 
only did they have doubts about the effects of the changes, but they were also quite critical of the number of 
changes and the way in which their organizations were prepared for the changes. Several interviewees said 
that the changes were not always well thought out and that they were introduced too quickly (see for more 
details: ter Bogt, 2005, 2007). 
12
 Findings from monitor research and other surveys amongst citizens in several municipalities suggest that 
citizens are, on average, not very satisfied with government and politics in general (see also Becker and 
Dekker, 2005, p. 344). However, they are usually ‘reasonably’ satisfied with such concrete aspects as the 
quality of municipal services and the maintenance of their neighbourhood (see also ter Bogt, 2005, pp. 75-
80).  
13
 The results of the 2006 municipal elections show a sharp decline in support to local ‘protest’ and ‘populist’ 
parties in many municipalities. Nevertheless, it seems that ‘traditional’ political stability has not yet been 
restored, as the traditional political parties still tend to feel rather uncertain internally (see also de Beus et al., 
2006). The 2006 elections for the parliament also confirm the picture of a relatively large political volatility.  
14
 As this paper concentrates on accounting change, it does not discuss whether performance-orientedness 
and a more ‘businesslike’ culture could have consequences that are interesting from the point of view of 
public administration, such as consequences for the integrity of civil servants and for the amount of attention 
paid to certain groups of stakeholders. 
